Canonical specimens — use these as reference when building your own argument. Each is a top-tier deck on both narrative and visual craft.
Elliott Investment Management → Phillips 66 (PSX)
2025-02-11 · N:5 V:4 C:5 · 53 pages
Phillips 66's conglomerate structure buries a world-class refiner and >$40bn midstream inside a low-multiple wrapper; spinning midstream, fixing refining and Marathon-style buybacks unlock $200-$300+ per share.
Greenlight Capital → Peloton Interactive (PTON)
2024-10-23 · N:5 V:4 C:5 · 30 pages
Peloton's overlooked subscription business — 68% gross margins, 1.5% churn — can deliver $400-500M EBITDA once costs are right-sized, implying a $7.50-$31.50 share price versus $5.48 today.
Land & Buildings Investment Management → Welltower Inc. (WELL)
2026-04-01 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 20 pages
Welltower's 10-year executive program could pay CEO Mitra up to $3 billion while incentivizing dilutive growth at a 144% NAV premium — shareholders should sell WELL and rotate into Ventas or AHR.
Spruce Point Capital Management → Bunge Global SA (BG)
2026-03-25 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 74 pages
Bunge is a levered agribusiness roll-up masking a failing Viterra deal with opaque accounting; strip out the hand-waving and the stock is worth $24-$55, 55-80% below $124.
Elliott Investment Management → Toyota Industries Corporation (6201)
2026-01-27 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 52 pages
Toyota Industries' ¥18,800 take-private undervalues the company by 39%; shareholders should reject the tender and pursue a Standalone Plan worth >¥40,000 per share.
Source: https://elliottletters.com/wp-content/uploads/Elliotts-Perpectives-on-Toyota-Industries-EN.pdf
Elliott Management → Toyota Industries Corporation (6201.T)
2026-01-27 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 52 pages
Toyota Real Estate's ¥18,800 TOB undervalues Toyota Industries by 39% versus NAV and 85% on core business; shareholders should refuse to tender and pursue a standalone plan instead.
Source: https://elliottletters.com/wp-content/uploads/Elliotts-Perpectives-on-Toyota-Industries-JP.pdf
Elliott Investment Management / Elliott Advisors (UK) → Toyota Industries Corporation (6201)
2026-01-18 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 17 pages
Toyota Fudosan's ¥18,800 squeeze-out of Toyota Industries undervalues NAV by ~40%; reject the TOB and back Elliott's Standalone Plan targeting >¥40,000 per share by 2028.
Elliott Management → Phillips 66 (PSX)
2025-05-06 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 33 pages
Phillips 66 is a conglomerate trading at a refiner multiple; replace four directors, spin Midstream/CPChem/JET, and buy back 80% of shares for ~75% upside to $183.
Source: https://streamline66.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Streamline-66-The-Choice-for-Shareholders.pdf
Palliser Capital → Keisei Electric Railway (9009)
2025-04-23 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 55 pages
Keisei trades at a 39% discount because its US$5bn OLC stake masks chronic underperformance; capping it below 15% plus a refreshed 11-member board unlocks US$3bn.
Oasis Management → Kao Corporation (4452.JP)
2025-02-26 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 136 pages
Kao is Japan's underperforming FMCG giant; adding five expert directors with FMCG, cosmetics and digital expertise plus performance-aligned pay can close the peer gap and revive growth.
Pershing Square Capital Management → Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (FNMA/FMCC)
2025-01-16 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 104 pages
Fannie and Freddie have already repaid Treasury at an 11.6% IRR; releasing them from conservatorship via modest IPOs unlocks ~$300bn of warrant value for taxpayers within two years.
Pershing Square Capital Management → Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac (FNMA / FMCC)
2025-01-16 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 104 pages
Release Fannie and Freddie from conservatorship at a 2.5% capital standard and IPO them at ~$30+/share; Treasury's warrants generate ~$300bn while shares re-rate 5-6x from ~$6 today.
Spruce Point Capital Management → Aegon Ltd. (AEG)
2024-12-16 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 82 pages
Aegon's distribution engine WFG is an aggressive MLM run amok with IUL churn, ex-WFG competitor GFI poaching top producers, and sum-of-parts pointing to 25-50% downside.
Palliser Capital → Rio Tinto (RIO)
2024-12-01 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 48 pages
Rio Tinto's 29-year-old dual-listed structure has destroyed ~US$50bn of value; unifying into a single Ltd-led entity unlocks +27% near-term upside and restores scrip-M&A firepower.
Engine Capital → Dye & Durham Limited (DND)
2024-12-01 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 112 pages
Dye & Durham's Board and CEO Matt Proud destroyed value chasing a $1bn EBITDA target through reckless M&A; Engine's six-director slate and new CEO can triple the share price to $46 in three years.
Starboard Value → Pfizer Inc. (PFE)
2024-10-01 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 74 pages
Pfizer squandered its $40bn COVID windfall on overpriced M&A while delivering almost none of the 15 promised blockbusters; the Board must hold management accountable.
Elliott Investment Management → Southwest Airlines (LUV)
2024-06-10 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 78 pages
Southwest has the worst margins of any major U.S. airline under a 74-year legacy leadership team; a new outside CEO, refreshed board and modernized commercial strategy can deliver a $49 share price, 77% upside.
Scorpion Capital → Lasertec Corporation (6920)
2024-06-05 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 334 pages
Lasertec — Japan's most-traded stock at $23B — is inflating inventory to hide that its flagship ACTIS EUV mask-inspection tool is defective; a 65-70% writedown will erase 85% of retained earnings.
Ancora Alternatives LLC → Norfolk Southern Corporation (NSC)
2024-04-15 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 193 pages
Norfolk Southern is the worst-performing Class I railroad under Alan Shaw; replacing the Board and installing UPS/CSX operators to run PSR closes the 780bps OR gap and unlocks $420 per share.
Trian Partners → The Walt Disney Company (DIS)
2024-03-01 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 133 pages
Disney lost its way under a distracted, unaccountable board; replacing two directors with Peltz and Rasulo restores focus on DTC margins, CEO succession, and capital discipline.
Source: https://restorethemagic.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Disney-Trian-White-Paper-2024.pdf
Trian Fund Management → The Walt Disney Company (DIS)
2024-03-01 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 133 pages
Disney's decade of underperformance stems from a board lacking focus and accountability; electing Peltz and Rasulo brings ownership mentality to fix succession, streaming economics and capital allocation.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001345471&type=DFAN14A
Palliser Capital → Samsung C&T Corporation (028260 KS)
2023-12-06 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 60 pages
Samsung C&T trades at a 63% discount to its $40.4bn NAV; fixing capital allocation, governance and the opaque group structure closes a $25bn value gap worth ~170% upside.
Spruce Point Capital Management → Samsara Inc. (IOT)
2023-09-21 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 88 pages
Samsara is a commodity-hardware vehicle-telematics company masquerading as a premium SaaS growth story; aggressive accounting inflates margins and a 16x revenue multiple implies 45%-75% downside to $6.30-$13.90.
Spruce Point Capital Management → Xylem Inc. (XYL)
2023-08-09 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 82 pages
Xylem overpaid in stock for SEC-fraud-charged Evoqua, just published two contradictory cash-flow statements, and faces 30-45% downside as multiples compress toward water-industrial peers.
Elliott Investment Management → The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (GT)
2023-05-11 · N:5 V:4 C:4 · 41 pages
Goodyear's industry-low 5% margin and under-monetized 715-store retail platform create $32/share of value vs $11 today — via board refresh, retail sale, and operational review.