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  "documentTitle": "Throne vs the kingdom",
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      "text": "In a classic study of entrepreneurial growth, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990:504) pose the question: “Some young firms become resounding successes ... Others languish as small firms. ... Why do these differences in organizational growth arise?” I extend previous work by analyzing a factor that should have a powerful effect on whether value is created or the organization languishes: the degree to which the founder maintains control. I explore the possibility that the startup’s resource needs drive a wedge between the growth of the startup and the founder’s ability to maintain control - a so-called “control dilemma.” Multiple steps along the entrepreneurial journey pose a tradeoff between attracting the resources required to build company value and being able to retain control of decision making.",
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      "text": "This study adds insights to several literatures. Within the entrepreneurship literature, conceptual studies (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Amit, MacCrimmon et al. 2000) have speculated that the desires for autonomy and control may affect the initial decision to launch a company, but have not broadened to include a fuller picture of company evolution. Likewise, analyses of entrepreneurial capital constraints have used bequests (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald 1998) and lottery winnings (e.g., Lindh and Ohlsson 1998) to examine the propensity to become an entrepreneur. The entrepreneurial-finance literature (e.g., Hamilton 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002) has suggested that, on average, entrepreneurs receive fewer pecuniary benefits than they might receive in paid employment, but has not examined whether this is true for some types of entrepreneurs but not for others, and has",
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      "text": "The key resources founders can attract include human capital, social capital, and financial capital (Sapienza, Korsgaard et al. 2003) provided by cofounders, hires, and investors. However, attracting those resources often comes at the cost of ownership stakes and decision-making control. I develop hypotheses about this tradeoff, and test the hypotheses on a unique dataset of 6,130 American startups collected between 2005-2012. The analyses tap all respondents in the dataset and use fixed-effects with repeat respondents in order to control for unobserved time-invariant company characteristics.",
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