{ "docId": "019dd923-5de0-76bd-a168-a3737f540343", "docSlug": "d791b7fba79d000b", "documentTitle": "Education: Mega Trends and Opportunities in Africa", "authorId": "LEK", "authorName": "Center for Global Development", "documentKindSlug": "consulting-deck", "documentKindLabel": "Consulting deck", "sourceTypeSlug": "strategy_consulting", "sourceTypeLabel": "Strategy consulting", "presentationDate": null, "orientation": "portrait", "aspectRatio": 0.773, "pageNumber": 13, "pageCount": 101, "prevPage": 12, "nextPage": 14, "slideType": "appendix_methodology", "function": "summarize", "density": "dense", "nDataPoints": 0, "notes": "This appears to be a page from a report or academic paper, likely an appendix or literature review section.", "elementsJson": [ "paragraph" ], "metadataConfidence": 0.9, "imagePath": null, "slideHref": "/slides/019dd923-5de0-76bd-a168-a3737f540343/13", "deckHref": "/decks/019dd923-5de0-76bd-a168-a3737f540343", "deckJsonHref": "/decks/019dd923-5de0-76bd-a168-a3737f540343.json", "deckAnchorHref": "/decks/019dd923-5de0-76bd-a168-a3737f540343#slide-13", "components": [ { "bbox": { "h": 0.12, "w": 0.66, "x": 0.17, "y": 0.51 }, "kind": "paragraph", "text": "New studies are exploring the nuances of how to implement these programs. In Tanzania, researchers tested two alternative incentive designs – one, a pay-for-percentile system where a teacher's bonus is based on students' ranks against other students with similar baseline scores, and the other program, where a teacher's bonus is based on students achieving benchmark proficiency levels, which the authors argue is easier to implement and gives teachers clearer targets. Both designs boosted test scores, but the latter program had larger impacts at a lower cost (Mbiti et al., 2019b).", "attrs": null, "subkind": "paragraph", "toolName": null, "toolSlug": null, "confidence": null, "componentId": "0de28aea-4106-4b53-be82-cc12256a19e1", "frameworkName": null, "frameworkSlug": null }, { "bbox": { "h": 0.05, "w": 0.66, "x": 0.17, "y": 0.09 }, "kind": "paragraph", "text": "evidence on performance pay for teachers in Africa was limited and mixed: a randomized trial in Kenya showed that performance bonuses for students increased test scores on the exams directly linked to the incentives, but not on general exams (Glewwe et al., 2010).", "attrs": null, "subkind": "paragraph", "toolName": null, "toolSlug": null, "confidence": null, "componentId": "1cbfbcf5-f861-4c99-b010-57021bab312b", "frameworkName": null, "frameworkSlug": null }, { "bbox": { "h": 0.26, "w": 0.66, "x": 0.17, "y": 0.64 }, "kind": "paragraph", "text": "Recent evaluations have also shown impacts from non-remunerative accountability interventions. In Côte d'Ivoire, providing twice-a-week text messages to either parents or teachers reduced dropout by between 2 and 2.5 percentage points (about 50 percent of the dropout rate in control schools). Texting both parents and teachers resulted in a much smaller, statistically insignificant impact. For low-attendance teachers, all three treatments had positive impacts (Lichand and Wolf 2020). In Tanzania, a low-stakes nationwide program that simply published school performance on primary school leaving exams led to more students passing the exam among schools that initially performed poorly. However, in an example of how even a low-stakes intervention can also adversely affect behaviors, the program also increased dropouts (Cilliers et al., 2020c). In Niger, a low-stakes, randomized intervention that complemented regular class inspections with phone calls to the village chief, the teacher, and two randomly selected students to check on whether adult education classes were being held and how they were going led to improved student learning (Aker and Ksoll, 2019).", "attrs": null, "subkind": "paragraph", "toolName": null, "toolSlug": null, "confidence": null, "componentId": "3e3bbe29-c605-4370-b343-6893a96a3f3b", "frameworkName": null, "frameworkSlug": null }, { "bbox": { "h": 0.02, "w": 0.02, "x": 0.49, "y": 0.94 }, "kind": "paragraph", "text": "11", "attrs": null, "subkind": "paragraph", "toolName": null, "toolSlug": null, "confidence": null, "componentId": "52717657-7115-4ab2-8556-0301a12eb4a5", "frameworkName": null, "frameworkSlug": null }, { "bbox": { "h": 0.35, "w": 0.66, "x": 0.17, "y": 0.15 }, "kind": "paragraph", "text": "A new generation of studies adds much more to our knowledge base (Appendix Table 5). All these new pay-for-performance programs take place in primary schools. In one study in Tanzania, performance-based bonuses to teachers had positive impacts on student learning in only one of the two tests administered, but when those bonuses were coupled with school grants, students performed consistently better in both tests and across all subjects (Mbiti et al., 2019a). Schools that received grants alone showed no performance gains. Teachers also support these programs in Tanzania, both in theory and in practice, reporting higher levels of satisfaction in schools that have performance pay (Mbiti and Schipper, 2020). In Rwanda, a novel experimental design separates the impact of performance pay on recruitment and on effort and finds favorable effects on both, with a significant net increase in student test scores (Leaver et al., 2019). A pay-for-performance program in Uganda had test score impacts only for the subset of students who attended schools that had books, although it did reduce dropout rates, which were not directly incentivized by the program (Gilligan et al., 2019). In Kenya, using contracts that are renewable based on performance to hire teachers also boosted student learning (Duflo et al., 2015a), an effort to scale up those contracts nationwide did not result in learning gains, potentially due to a combination of political opposition, reduced monitoring, and delayed salaries (Bold et al., 2018).", "attrs": null, "subkind": "paragraph", "toolName": null, "toolSlug": null, "confidence": null, "componentId": "a682ddf3-bc8e-44b5-a35e-8c4f26f5ca02", "frameworkName": null, "frameworkSlug": null } ], "metrics": [], "tools": [ { "name": "Analytical method", "slug": "analytical-method", "agent": null, "layer": "slide", "matchId": "be9bea5d-79c7-4798-82ee-63439c363d60", "evidence": "New studies are exploring the nuances of how to implement these programs. 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